DATE: 04-11-2006

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 AUC TAM/MLT/CLS

REASON: 1 4 (B.D)

DEGGAGGS I #1006600 4-11-2031

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### FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Precedence: IMMEDIATE Date: 12/29/1999

To: All Field Offices Attn: ADIC or SAC

All FBIHQ Divisions

From: Counterterrorism Division

NS3H/SIOC/CAT A/B

Contact:

Approved By: Pickard Thomas A

Watson Dale L

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U) 265A-SE-83340 (Pending)

(U) 265A-NY-259391 (Pending)

(U) 199N-NY-273641 (Pending)

Title: (U) AHMED RESSAM

AOT-IT OO:SE

USAMA BIN LADEN IT-BIN LADEN

00:NY

SBIH BENYAMIN IT-UBL/AL-QAEDA

00:NY

LUCIA GAROFALO BOUABIDE GHAMCHI

AOT-IT OO:AL

Synopsis: (U) To provide all SACs and LEGATs with an update regarding the above captioned cases.

(S) Classified By: 4877, NS3/CTD Reason : 1.5(c)

SECRET/ORCON/NOFORM

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism Division

Re: (U) 265A-SE-83340, 12/29/1999

### Declassify On: X-1

Details: Reference FBIHQ EC, dated 12/22/99, captioned as above. The referenced communication furnished all SACs and LEGATS with details regarding ongoing Usama Bin Laden operations and threats. This EC will primarily focus on events after 12/22/99.

#### Arrests in Jordan

JS/NF/OC) As you are aware, in early 12/99, the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (GID) arrested thirteen individuals who were participating in a bombing plot. The group arrested was linked to Usama Bin Lagran (INT) and described as both advanced and sophisticated

and non-conventional IED training. On 12/15/99, the GID arrested two additional individuals believed to be connected to the compromised Jordanian Bin Laden cell. One of the two individuals was unidentified. The other was identified as Sa'id Abd Al-Rahman Muhammad Hijazi. Sa'id Hijazi is not cooperating with GID authorities.

NF/OC) During the arrests, the GID seized walkie-talkie radios rigged to function as remote detonators. The GID also found a CD-ROM containing an explosives manual published by Khalil Deek.

OC/NF) Three individuals associated with this plot remain at large. One individual (referred to above) has been identified as Raed Mohammed Hijazi (USPER), aka Abu Ahmed Al-Amriki. Raed is purportedly the leader of a separate UBL cell. Raed Hijazi and other unidentified individuals reportedly have plans to carry out an unspecified terrorist operation or operations at an unknown locations. These attacks will occur at the behest of UBL. On 12/17/99, FBIHQ issued an NLETS message to the community relative to these events.

(U) (NF/OC) Following the arrests in Jordan, FBI New York dispatched an ASAC and four SAs to Jordan. New York remains involved in all related developments in Jordan, and stands ready to respond to events worldwide.

//OC/NF) Hijazi is a Jordanian/American citizen who
carries a valid U.S. passport issued in London, England, on
1/9/95. His passport was extended to 10 years in 1996 at the

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U.S. Embassy in Amman. It is currently valid until 2005. Sa'id indicated after his arrest that his brother had called their parents house in Jordan from the United States on 12/13/99 stating that he intended to return to Jordan within a few days. The Jordanians do not believe Sa'id's statement. On 12/18/99, FBIHQ issued an NLETS message to the community relative to Hijazi and efforts to locate him.

Adams was arrested in Pakistan and extradited to Jordan for his role in the planned attacks in Jordan. Deek holds both Jordanian and U.S. citizenship. Deek's roommate, Idris Ahmed, was also arrested in Pakistan. Ahmed is a dual Pakistani and British citizen. He remains in Pakistan. Following Deek's arrest, the New York Field Office dispatched an investigative team that included CART personnel to Pakistan.

(S)

MS/OC/NF) Materials which include computers, computer disks and pocket litter obtained from the arrests in Jordan and Pakistan are currently being translated and evaluated for lead purposes. Obviously, the utmost priority is to determine if there is any information indicating future attacks and prevent such attacks. To date, no such information has been obtained, although further analysis of what we have learned may generate leads for FBI field and LEGAT offices. All SACs and LEGATs are requested to give these leads priority status when received.

#### Seattle Arrest of Ahmed Ressam

(LES) On the evening of 12/14/99, Benni Antoine Noris arrived at Port Angeles, Washington from British Columbia, Canada in a rented green Chrysler 300 Sedan with Quebec license plate ANF304. Officers of the United States Customs Service (USCS) were suspicious of subject's attempt to cross the border at an obscure location in a vehicle from Quebec. Subsequent fingerprints checks by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) confirmed that Norris is identifiable with Ahmed Ressam, DPOB: 5/9/67, Algeria.

S/OC/NF) Ressam has been determined to be a member of

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
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an Algerian/Bin Laden affiliated cell in Montreal, Quebec, which has links to UBL lieutenant Abu Zubaida. Currently, Ressam is not cooperating with U.S. officials and has not provided any information regarding possible accomplices or bombing sites/plans.

(LES) The FBI Laboratory determined that Ressam was transporting explosive materials. Review of pocket litter obtained during the arrest of Ressam resulted in recovery of



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REQ 3-1a

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### LEAD(s):

### Set Lead 1:

#### ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

For your information. Please read and clear.

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To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism Division

Re: (U) 265A-SE-83340, 12/29/1999

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Closing

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S/NF/OC) In response to the threat, the FBI has taken an aggressive posture. Numerous resources have been expended to address the threat. In order to cover targets adequately, many field offices have instituted 24-hour physical surveillance and other coverage. The entire gambit of investigative possibilities have been exhausted in response to this threat. We have also acquired translation support from the Department of Defense and intelligence community agencies.

which are being vigorously pursued, the FBI is aggressively working with criminal and intelligence services, both domestic and foreign, to counter this threat. FBIHQ will keep the field advised of all further developments as they unfold.

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(U) All SACs and LEGATs are reminded all inquiries from the press should be forwarded to the Press Office at FBIHQ.

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